Introduction
The abandonment of the gold standard in April 1933 is generally considered to be the turning point in the Great Depression.
1 As a consequence of the devaluation of the dollar the country experienced large capital inflows that were monetized by the Federal Reserve. This resulted in higher credit and helped generate an expansion in aggregate demand and, more importantly, a reduction in unemployment. The centrality of the devaluation is clearly captured in the following two quotes. According to Romer (1992, p.781 (Hoover 1952, p. 279) :
"Both Secretary [of the Treasury Ogden] Mills and I were confidentially informed early in the campaign that some of Mr. Roosevelt advisers proposed an abandonment of the gold standard or devaluation, and the substitution of a 'managed currency' as an overall method of raising prices and wages…"
The word "confidentially" is fundamental to understand the dynamics of this episode. If devaluing the USD was indeed part of FDR's economic program, he would not have publicized it or discussed it with the press. The sheer hint of devaluation would have created a stampede and financial panic, and a major drain in gold reserves. That is, if it was seriously considered, the plan would have been kept under wraps, and would have been known only to a very small number of people.
In this paper I revisit the period leading to the abandonment of convertibility, and I make an effort to set the record straight on what the important players -and in particular FDR and the members of the "Brains Trust" -thought about the gold standard. My conclusion is that during the primary and the presidential campaigns, neither Roosevelt nor the members of his inner circle had a strong view on gold or the dollar. They did believe in the need to experiment with different policies in order to get the country out of the slump, and tinkering with the value of the currency was a possible area for experimentation; but it was an option with a rather low priority, certainly lower than implementing a massive public works program, creating the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), and passing an agricultural bill that would implement a crops allotment system. 4 FDR close advisers believed that the gold standard generated cycles of deflation and inflation, but there was no formal plan to implement a devaluation, neither were there any studies that examined in detail what would be the possible consequences of abandoning the gold standard. 5 Moreover, my analysis of different archives, documents, diaries, memoranda, correspondence, and memoirs suggests that FDR and his main advisers did not understand fully how a devaluation of the dollar was supposed to work; in particular, there was no clear notion of how it could affect trade flows. I also show that during the period under analysis -all of 1932 and the first two months of 1933 -George F. Warren, the Cornell professor who would achieve great notoriety in the second half of 1933, had limited influence on Roosevelt's thinking on the currency. 6 Until Inauguration Day (March 4 th 1933) FDR's views on the gold standard were ambivalent and noncommittal; he was neither a diehard fan of the system, nor was he a severe critic.
What adds interest to this story is that the U.S. was not "forced" off the gold standard, as the United Kingdom in 1931. It is true that during the early months of 1933 there were substantial gold outflows, and that much of this was the result of foreign withdrawals, but in April 1933 the stock of monetary gold exceeded $4 billion, amply meeting the Federal Reserve's "cover ratio." Moreover, the outflows were not the result of a negative current account. They responded to uncertainty about how the incoming Administration was going to handle the banking crisis that 4 See Lindley's (1933) classical study of the first year of the Roosevelt administration. Barber (1996) provides an analysis of the relationship between FDR and economists during his four administrations. His analysis shows that professional economists joined the administration in larger numbers in 1934, after the dollar had been devalued. See Steil (2013) for an analysis of Harry Drexler White's contributions to policy design during this period. 5 Irving Fisher believed in abandoning gold and adopting a "compensated dollar" but he was not close to Roosevelt -see the detailed discussion below. George F. Warren, as will be discussed, did advocate a devaluation of the USD, but, as noted below, until mid-1933 he didn't have much influence over FDR. This changed in mid-July, as discussed in Section 7. For a detailed discussion of Warren's plan see, for example, Sumner (2001) . 6 As I show below, until July 1933 Warren met FDR only twice, and both times as part of large groups. I thank Eric Rauchway for helping me clarify this issue.
had taken a turn for the worst during the weeks before inauguration. 7 Political instability, including the assassination attempt on the President-elect on February 15, also contributed to uncertainty. 8 My interest in this paper is on the period leading to the abandonment of the gold standard on April 19 1933. For this reason, the many and important events that took place between that date and the adoption of the Gold Act on January 30 1933 -including FDR's gold buying programare only discussed briefly in Section 7.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 I provide some information on the state of the economy in 1932. This serves as background for the analysis that follows. In Section 3 I deal with the formation of the Brains Trust, and I discuss the qualifications, experience and training of its senior members. Section 4 concentrates on the primary and presidential campaigns. I discuss the position of the Brains Trust with respect to gold, inflation, "reflation," prices, and the dollar. The analysis focuses on the "compensated dollar," including Irving Fisher's distinction between policies aimed at "correction" and those geared at "safeguarding" price stability. In Section 5 I discuss the nature of FDR's assurances regarding the gold standard during the campaign, and I analyze an important (but little known) speech delivered just days before the election (the Covenant Speech). Section 6 deals with the transition, the preparations for the London Economic and Monetary Conference, and with the question of whether to "stabilize the exchanges." Section 7 contains a brief rendition of what happened between March 4 1933 and January 31 1934, when the dollar was officially devalued. Section 8 has the conclusions. There is also a Data Appendix.
Background: The economy in 1932
From today's perspective it is difficult to imagine the depth of the Great Depression. Between 1929 and 1932, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measured in current dollars declined by almost 50%, production of durable goods, including automobiles, dropped by 81%, and the value of agricultural production was down by an astonishing 63%. During the same period employment declined by almost 50% -that is, one out of every two people that in July 1929 had a job had lost it by March 1932 -, and the number of unemployed surpassed 15 million people. Those that still had jobs were earning much less than during 1929: according to the Federal Reserve, average wages had declined by 67%, and cash income in the rural sector had gone down by more than 70%.
One of the most destructive aspects of the crisis was the generalized decline in prices. Between mid-1929 and mid-1932 the index of wholesale prices went down by approximately 70%; during the same period the cost of living declined by 40%. Things were particularly bad in the agricultural sector, where the prices of some crops were so low that it was not worth it to harvest them. Between 1919 and 1932 the average value of an acre of land for farming declined by almost 60%; the average price of cattle dropped by 63%, and that of hogs by almost 80%. The price of a dozen eggs went from 41.3 cents in 1919 to only 14.2 cents in 1933 -a decline of 66%. A bushel of wheat that in 1919 had commanded $1.53 was sold at 13.5 cents in 1932. And the price of cotton, the commodity that Roosevelt would monitor throughout his first presidency, experienced a decline from 35.34 cents per pound in 1919, to 6.52 cents in 1932 -a reduction of 82%.
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As soon as he was sworn in as President, FDR pointed out that he wanted to see a price of cotton above 10 cents a pound by the end of 1933. In May, however, his goal became more ambitious, and he announced that the objective of his economic policy was to return agricultural prices to their 1926 level. For wheat that was $1.22 per bushel, while for cotton it meant 12.5 cents per pound, almost double of what it had been during 1932. Throughout 1919 Throughout -1932 prices of manufactured goods and of inputs used in the agricultural sector also declined, but by much less than those of agricultural commodities.
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Figure 1 contains monthly data from1915 through 1940 for the quantity of money (M2), the monetary base (or high powered money), the stock of monetary gold, and the multiplier (See the Appendix for data sources). The April 1933-January 1934 period is shaded. The story that emerges from these graphs is well known and forms part of the "received wisdom" on the Great Depression. 12 Although the monetary base increased by 18.3% between September 1929 and April 1933, the stock of M2 money declined by 34.7% during the same period. The reason for this drop was the collapse of the multiplier. Although the stock of monetary gold remained flat, at approximately $4.1 billion, it experienced significant month to month variations in 1931, 1932, and early 1933 . Figure 1 also shows the relaxation in monetary conditions after the January 1934 (official) devaluation of the dollar. As may be seen, this was the result of the increase in base money, which, in turn, was the consequence of large gold inflows; the multiplier remained essentially flat. Finally, this figure also captures the change in monetary policy stance in 1937, when the Federal Reserve began to sterilize monetary inflows.
In Figure 2 I In Figure 3 I present monthly data on the wholesale and consumer price indexes from 1910 through 1940. In Figure 4 I display data for four of the most important components of the wholesale price index for [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] . The data in Figure 3 show the rapid increase in prices during the Great War, followed by a long and acute disinflation. It also confirms that prices began to increase in 1933-34 after the U.S. abandoned the gold standard. The data in Figure 4 , on the other hand, show that the decline in prices was anything but uniform; farm and food prices declined much more acutely than prices of manufactured goods, metals, and services.
The Brains Trust
In March 1932, Sam Rosenman and Basil "Doc" O'Connor, two of Roosevelt's long-time associates, decided to put together a small group of advisers to assist the Governor gather information for speeches and press conferences. The Democratic convention was approaching quickly, and it looked as if FDR was going to get the two thirds of the votes required for the nomination. During the earlier parts of the primary campaign Roosevelt had assailed the Republican administration for letting the economic situation deteriorate markedly and for allowing unemployment grow to 15 million people. What he hadn't done, however, was make many specific policy proposals on how to get the country out of the depression; most of his statements were considered to be general and without much forward looking content. Now that he had the largest number of delegates the press was scrutinizing every one of his statements. They were looking for inconsistencies, platitudes, and knowledge gaps. Ernest Lindley, an influential reporter who followed the campaign closely, and had written an early biography of Roosevelt, thought that the candidate "ought to say more than he had been saying about what has to be done. The second member of the Brains Trust was Rexford G. Tugwell, a 41 year old economics professor at Columbia. Tugwell earned a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Pennsylvania, and was convinced that modern management techniques could bring generalized prosperity. He believed, however, that if left on its own modern industry would fall in the traps of "overproduction." In order to avoid wasteful situations, some sort of planning was of essence. After visiting the Soviet Union in the late 1920s he became an even stronger believer in the merits of economic planning. Although he was a tenured professor at Columbia, he was not a member of the Graduate School, and his teaching was confined to undergraduates. Years later he would write that talking about economics with Roosevelt was like teaching the rudiments of the discipline to college freshmen.
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The third recruit was Adolf A. Berle, Jr., also a professor of law at Columbia. He graduated from Harvard Law School at age 21, and briefly worked at Louis D. Brandeis's law firm in Boston. It was from Brandeis that Berle got his dislike for large banks, trusts, and financiers. In contrast to Brandeis, however, Berle thought that large corporations should be regulated, and not broken up into smaller units. In 1919, at age 24, he was appointed Acting Chief of the Russian Section of the American Delegation at Versailles. In 1932 he co-authored an influential book on the modern corporation that showed, in a systematic way, how economic power had become concentrated in America, and how difficult it was to govern companies when ownership and control were not in the same hands. This book, which is still in print, provided one of the early treatments of what we know today as the "principal agent problem" (Berle and Means, 1932) .
As the presidential campaign unfolded, three new members joined the advisory group as somewhat informal Brains Trust "associates": Robert K. Straus, a graduate of Harvard's Business School, General Hugh Johnson, a lawyer that for many years had worked for financier and FDR supporter Bernard M. Baruch, and Charles W. Taussig, a successful businessman that in 1932 was President of the American Molasses Company and the Sucrest Corporation (he was a nephew of respected Harvard professor and trade expert Frank Taussig). As the campaign moved forward other professionals wrote memoranda and gathered information for the Brains Trust. Although they were not full members of the mythical group, they made important 16 On the origins of the Brains Trust and on how the group got its name see the memoires by Moley (1939) and Tugwell (1968) . For a historical analysis that puts the Brains Trust in context -and for a detailed timeline -see Schlesinger (1957) . 17 Tugwell (1968) Until that time no presidential candidate had ever conveyed a group of academics to provide technical advice on campaign and policy issues. 18 As a result, Raymond Moley and his associates attracted immediate attention (and criticism) from the press. They were followed, and "reporters besieged [them]… for a word"; at times they were treated with respect, while at others they were ridiculed.
19 FDR referred to them as "my privy council," and in more than one occasion the press called them, rather derisively, "the professors."
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When recruiting the Brains Trust, FDR was not interested in theoreticians or great thinkers. He wanted smart people able to analyze and summarize vast amounts of data and put them in historical perspective. He also wanted individuals with a literary bent that would help him find the right turn of phrase and coin catchy terms for his speeches and public addresses. At some level, then, it may be argued that the members of the Brains Trust came on board as "high-grade research assistants." 21 It didn't take too much time, however, for the trio to prove its value and to gain significant influence over the candidate. Even before the Democratic Convention in August 1932, they had helped FDR define key aspects of his program, including the agricultural allotment system that was to become the core of the AAA. As Schlesinger (1957, p. 400 ) points out, it was soon clear to FDR that Berle and Tugwell were "continuously fertile in ideas, and neither was constrained by the past or intimidated by the future". H.G. Wells made the following remarks after meeting Berle: "He began to unfold a view of the world to me that seemed to contain all I had ever learned and thought, but better arranged and closer to reality."
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From early on, the meetings between the Brains Trust and FDR were productive and helped him clarify concepts and draft policies. Schlesinger (1957 p. 401) described the gatherings in Albany as follows: "Moley urbanely steering the discussion, Tugwell and Berle flashing ahead with their ideas… and always Roosevelt, listening, interrupting, joking, needling, and cross-examining, absorbing the ideas and turning them over in his mind." According to Lindley (1933, p. 25) when the Brains Trust met with the governor "the conversation roamed over the whole field of economics: the causes of the depression, the methods [and policies] of relieving it, the main points of attack." After a few weeks in the job, it was clear to anyone that saw them in action -18 An interesting question -and one that is beyond the scope of this paper -is comparing the Brains Trust to "The Inquiry," the group set up by Woodrow Wilson in 1917 to advise him on how to handle the forthcoming peace process. The Inquiry was much larger, and it mostly worked in secret. Many of its members were, as in the case of the Brains Trust, associated to Columbia University. 19 Time magazine, July 3, 1933, quoted by Tugwell (1952) in the introduction to his revised New Deal diaries in Namorato (1992), p. 376. 20 Moley (1939, p. 21-22) . 21 I thank Craufurd Goodwin for suggesting that I tackled the question of whether the Brains Trusters were considered to be mere assistants, or policy advisers. The term "high-grade research assistant" is Lindley's. See Lindley (1933, p. 23) . 22 Quoted in Schlesinger (1957, p. 400) .
including to the members of the press that followed the candidate anywhere he went -that the members of the Brains Trust were not mere assistants; they were real -and very influentialadvisers to the Governor of New York and democratic frontrunner.
The Brains Trust sphere of influence, however, was strictly confined to ideas and policy advice; they played no role in the purely political aspects of the campaign. Lindley (1933, p. 413 Tugewell (1952 , footnote 8), reproduced in Namorato (1992 . 27 Tugwell was a prolific writer, and many of his pieces were published in the popular press. In 1925 he became a contributing editor of The New Republic. For his complete bibliography until 1959, see Sternsher (1964 The most basic material is in Chapter 17, where a simple exposition of the quantity theory is provided (pp. 335-337) , the difference between money and credit is explained (pp. 334-335) , and the institutional organization of the Federal Reserve System is presented (pp. 339-342). The discussion on gold is limited, and no detailed explanation of the mechanics of the gold standard is provided. The chapter does mention that money is backed partially by bullion, but it doesn't delve into the relation between gold flows and the external accounts.
The discussion in Chapter 16 is rather more sophisticated, and concentrates on price variability and uncertainty under the gold standard. Tugwell et. al. write (p. 319, emphasis added) :
ur dollars, being constituted as they are, shift in value. That is to say that although they are nominally based on a fixed standard, they actually will buy more goods at one time than at another... [I] t is a constant source of uncertainty that the dollar shrinks and expands in purchasing power… This may seem a strange phenomenon at first. But it is directly consequent upon the fact that we have adopted gold as the standard of money and that the dollar has been made equal in value to 23.22 grains of it."
Uncertainty, the authors say, "makes it almost impossible to plan exactly any distance ahead." As a possible solution to this "constant source of uncertainty," Tugwell and associates present Irving Fisher's "compensated dollar" proposal that would peg the value of the dollar to a basket of goods (commodities) instead of pegging it to gold. provided the first detailed presentation of the proposal. In the introductory paragraph to this article Fisher says that the goal of the scheme "is rendering the gold standard more 'stable' by virtually increasing the weight of the gold dollar so as to compensate for losses of purchasing power." 34 Under the proposal, dollar coins would cease to circulate and would be replaced by a "virtual gold dollar" with a variable gold content. Although Fisher's discussion is based on the hypothetical case when there are positive inflationary pressures -a situation that calls for "increasing the weight of the gold dollar" -, the argument is perfectly symmetrical for a period of deflationary forces; this would call for decreasing the weight of the gold dollar (or devaluing the currency). The article has two lengthy appendixes. The first is aimed at dispelling the notion that this system would encourage speculation in gold, and the second contains an example of how the gold content of the dollar would have evolved between 1896 and 1911 under this program.
In the years that followed, Fisher worked strenuously on refining the plan, and in 1920 he published a 305 pages book titled Stabilizing the Dollar. The subtitle illustrates clearly Fisher's policy objectives: "A plan to stabilize the general price level without fixing individual prices." Most of the technical details are confined to an 88 page appendix (Appendix I). Appendix II is devoted to answering the criticisms that the proposal had generated since its inception in 1911. And in Appendix IV he lists a number of authors, some of them very prominent, whom according to him were precursors of the compensated dollar idea. As time passed, Fisher was able to convince some members of Congress to support his plan, and in late December 1922 the House of Representatives Committee on Banking and Currency held hearings on a bill sponsored 31 Tugewell (1933) , reproduced in Namomoto (1992), p. 60. 32 Tugwell (1968) . P.98. 33 The proposal is sketched in Chapter 13, Section 5. Fisher writes in the "Suggestions to Readers" that this chapter will appeal mostly to "currency reformers." The term "compensated dollar" doesn't appear in this book. 34 Fisher (1913, p. 213) by Congressman T. Alan Goldsborough from Maryland. Although the bill never got out of Committee, Fisher was not discouraged; he continued to work on the issue, and in his books The Money Illusion (1928), and Booms and Depressions (1932) he devoted long passages to the plan. 35 Fisher criticism of the gold standard was based on the idea that since gold was both a medium of exchange and a commodity, its value would permanently fluctuate. 36 Let be the relative price of gold in terms of a basket of goods. This price will vary according to supply and demand conditions. Supply is mostly determined by mineral availability, new discoveries, and mining costs in different parts of the world. Total demand, on the other hand, depends on both the demand for monetary uses and the demand for other purposes. Let be the price of gold in dollars, or exchange rate. If is the price level -expressed as dollars per basket of goods -then, it follows that:
If the dollar price of gold is fixed at, say, $20.67 per ounce (as had been the case in the U.S. since 1834), the price level would move in strict proportionality with the relative price of gold. With a fixed , the variance of the price index would be, , a high number, given the volatility of the relative prices of commodities.
Fisher's proposal was that instead of being pegged to gold, the currency value should be linked to a basket of goods, as a way of stabilizing the price level.
38 A direct implication of this proposal is that the price of gold in terms of dollars would cease to be a fixed number, and would fluctuate frequently. At the conceptual level, the idea was that , in which case, and according to equation (1), : the price level would be stabilized.
Fisher's concrete policy suggestion was to adjust according to the discrepancy between the observed price index (with some lag) and the index in the base year: . In most of his examples the factor of proportionality , which he calls "adjustment," is Marshall. 37 This assumes that the baskets of goods in the right hand side and left hand side are the same. This is a specific version of the purchasing power parity (PPP) proposition, and assumes a unitary pass-through. This equation does not appear in Stabilizing the Dollar. Patinkin (1993) uses a very similar expression in his discussion of Fisher's currency reform proposals. 38 Of course, Fisher realized that an alternative to his proposal was to stabilize the price of gold relative to goods, and discusses this possibility in several of his writings. This could be attempted, for example, by the main producers of gold who could form a cartel. In fact a proposal along these lines had been made by a South African academic, Professor R.A. Lehfeldt. Controlling , however, was less practical than frequently adjusting .
set equal to one. 39 Fisher suggested that the change in would be capped by a predetermined value, say 1% per quarter. If, for instance, was 3%, it would then take three quarters to go through the exchange rate adjustment required to stabilize the price level. An important feature of Fisher's proposal is that there would be a 1% spread between the selling and buying (or mint) price of gold. He called this spread a "brassage," and its purpose was to discourage speculation.
In Appendix I of Stabilizing the Dollar, Fisher presented a diagram that showed the actual evolution of the wholesale price level between 1990 and 1919, and the much more stable price index that, according to him, would have prevailed if his scheme had been in place -see Figure  5 . As may be seen, until 1915 the hypothetical price index shows remarkable stability in comparison to actual prices -in fact, in every single month it is within 4% of parity. While in January 1915, the observed index was almost 140, the simulated index is only 104. After the war, and mostly due to the cap on the bi-monthly adjustment in the price of gold, the hypothetical index increases significantly; but still, at its peak, in 1918, it is approximately one half of the actual index.
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In Booms and Depression Fisher calls a large and once-and-for-all, adjustment in the price of gold a "correction," and he distinguishes it from the repeated manipulation of required to maintain prices stability, which he calls "safeguard." This is an important distinction: price stability may be "safeguarded" through small and frequent changes in the price of gold , in a way that is not very different from the "crawling peg" exchange rate regime adopted in the 1960's, 1970s, and 1980s by a number of developing countries, including Brazil, Chile and Colombia. It also has some similarities to the "exchange rate targeting" monetary policy followed by the Monetary Authority of Singapore since the late 1990s. The key in all of these cases is that the changes in are small -as noted, Fisher himself thought that an upper bound for adjusting would be 2% per quarter -, and frequent.
A "correction" in contrast requires a (very) large change in ; if the situation is one of deflation, this means a large devaluation. For instance, in late 1932, a straight forward application of Fisher's partial equilibrium simulation would have indicated that a price of gold of $32.25 was needed in order to achieve the 1926 price index goal. Many economists, including Tugwell, as we will see, were leery of devaluations of this magnitude. In particular, they thought that they could unleash a sequence of repeated and increasingly large "corrections," and a rapid inflationary process. There were also unknown secondary effects, including possible changes in 39 In every one of Fisher's writings on the subject, and in all the criticism of his plan, the issue of what type of price index is to be used (wholesale vs consumer, for instance) is very central. This was, to a large extent, due to the newness of index numbers, and to the fact that many people didn't understand and/or trust them. 40 This simulation is based on a number of assumptions regarding the pass-through from to , the adjustment lag, the width of the "brassage," and the long run trend in the general price index. Fisher discusses them, as well as alternative assumptions, in Section 9 of Appendix I of Stabilizing the Dollar (p. 183).
that could feed back into prices in an unpredictable fashion. In addition, large changes in could generate -as indeed they did after January 1934 -serious legal problems stemming from the fact that the majority of private and public long term debts were indexed to the price of gold through the so called "gold clause." In a December 16 1932 letter to Ray Moley, Fisher wrote: "Personally, I would like to cut loose from the gold standard, but it is not an easy matter both because of the absolute necessity of gradually changing the price of gold and of the complications of the gold clause contracts."
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In Stabilizing the Dollar Fisher pointed out that his proposal was compatible with the quantity theory, and he emphasized that the mechanism through which the compensated dollar would impact the price level would be increases and decreases in the quantity of money. In later writings he added that in order for the scheme to work properly it would require the intervention (or, in his words, "the good will") of the Federal Reserve. 42 This point, which may seem almost anecdotal, becomes important when Fisher's compensated dollar is compared to George F. Warren's gold buying plan, the program that dominated America's policy towards gold and the dollar in the second half of 1933. After explaining their basic equation, Warren and Pearson (1935, p. 94) Lindley (1933, p. 36) . Interestingly, in his 379-page biography of Roosevelt published in 1931, Lindley doesn't mention "inflation" or "gold" as policy issues or concerns. This is particularly telling, since the purpose of that book was to explain to the American public the views and policy inclinations of the Governor of New York, a politician in the ascendant who was likely to play a prominent role in the national scene. Tugwell, who in spite of not being a monetary theorist was a solid economist, was concerned that maintaining "sound money," however vague the term was, and remonetizing silver, were contradictory policies.
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In his 1939 memoir Moley writes repeatedly of his efforts to push back on those who wanted FDR to follow an "internationalist" policy and give the exchanges a priority during the first months of the administration. He writes that he "would lean heavily on… Rex Tugwell and Adolf Berle, who agreed with me in opposition to traditional internationalism…" And he adds that it was important to let everyone know "that Roosevelt was likely to be no Herbert Hoover or 54 Tugwell (1968, p 158) , emphasis in the original. This view, Tugwell would recognize more than thirty years later, neglected the fact that a general price level hike would help dilute the real value of debts, whose burden had greatly increased since 1929 as a result of deflation (Tugwell 1968, p, 158-159 
The Covenant Speech
Herbert Hoover barely campaigned during the first nine months of 1932. He believed that his post was at the White House, dealing with the nation's many problems. He also believed that voters would understand that the Depression was the result of external forces and that he had done everything possible to ameliorate its effects. In October, there was a new wave of bank failures and prices fell once again. Reelection didn't look so clear after all, and the President decided to campaign aggressively and to go on the attack.
In his memoirs In view of these attacks, the Roosevelt campaign decided to follow a two part strategy. First, Senator Carter Glass, a venerable figure who was known for his orthodoxy in monetary affairs, was recruited to give a radio speech on the subject of gold and money. Second, it was decided that the candidate himself would respond directly to Hoover's attacks a few days before the elections.
Glass's speech was a masterful piece of oratory. To some, this speech is the ultimate example of a cunning politician's doublespeak; he pledged support to sound money and not to the gold standard. Further, when referring to the covenant implicit in the gold clause, he said it in a way that could be interpreted as being a statement by Senator Glass, and not by him. This, indeed, was Hoover's interpretation. But there is another reading. The Covenant Speech was sincere, and the decision to avoid a pledge to maintain the gold standard was not because of the Governor's maliciousness, but it reflected, as Adolf Berle pointed out in his diary, FDR's genuine doubts and hesitations. He plainly didn't know what to do. Be it as it may, it is interesting to note that five years later, when the first volumes of FDR speeches and public papers were published, the Covenant Speech was not included. Indeed, today it is difficult to find a complete version of what the candidate said on the verge of the elections.
The transition: Rumors and more rumors
On November 8 1932 Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected president by a landslide. He had promised to focus on domestic problems and to relegate international issues to a secondary plane; he had also committed himself to follow "sound money" policies. For many, including for Senator Carter Glass, this meant that the gold standard would be maintained at any cost. To others, the gold issue continued to be on the table, and devaluing the dollar was not completely ruled out; what to do would depend on the circumstances.
During the transition Ray Moley's role and influence grew significantly. According to Schlesinger (1957, p. 450) , "Moley was now functioning more than ever as his [FDR's] alter ego -a whole cabinet rolled into one, trying to heard all major issues of both domestic and foreign policy." Some members of Congress, such as Huey Long, thought highly of him, while others were concerned about his increasing power. As Schlesinger reports (1957, p. 451), Sam Rayburn of Texas quipped "I hope we don't have any god-damned Rasputin in this Administration." In November 1932, Ray Moley's transition from a "high-grade research assistant" to one of the most influential presidential advisers in the history of the U.S. was complete.
Views on gold in early 1933
During the transition, supporters and detractors of the gold standard continued to put pressure on the President-elect. In a November 1932 memorandum, Tugwell wrote that "[w]hatever stance Governor Roosevelt takes, he can be sure that half of the economists will be on his side, and half will be against it. There can be no bitterer academic dispute than the dispute that has been raging over what can and should be done about the fallen price level. The plain truth of the matter seems to be that very little is really known about monetary problems, and opinion seems to be as much matter of temperament and moral upbringing as of rational thought process." Warren, a professor of agronomy at Cornell University… His academic guarantee was that devaluation…would raise prices and wages." As it happened, starting in July of 1933 the United States' policies towards gold and the currency were highly influenced by Warren's theory that linked, in a rather mechanical way, the price of gold to the price of agricultural products. According to his analysis -undertaken with statistician Frank A. Pearson, and based on centuries of data examination -, if the price of gold (in terms of dollars) was increased through a devaluation, there would be an almost instantaneous and proportional increase in agricultural prices. 70 Roosevelt, the experimentalist, the man who loved to épater le bourgeoise, the president who had promised to take care of the forgotten man from the rural states, decided to try out Warren's theory during the second half of 1933. The move was controversial and created great uncertainty. But not only that, its results were questionable and led Keynes to make his famous quip that "the recent gyrations of the dollar have looked to me more like a gold standard on the booze than the ideal managed currency of my dreams."
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In early 1933, the gold standard also had a number of prominent defenders. For them it was essential that the U.S. had a monetary system based on a metallic standard; this was the only way to maintain stability and avoid future inflation. The best-known and respected supporter of gold was Edwin W. Kemmerer, a banking professor at Princeton, who had helped found the central banks of many Latin American countries and was known as the "Money Doctor." A letter drafted by him and signed by ten members of the Princeton faculty stated that maintaining the gold standard was essential for regaining "public confidence and… Warren and Pearson (1933, 1935 Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Metzler (2003) , among others, during most of this period the Federal Reserve System was largely inactive -the exception being the purchases of $ 1 billion of government paper during April-August 1932. This passive policy stance was, to some extent, the consequence of the OMPC's concern about safeguarding the nations gold reserves -the so-called "free gold" problem.
A number of academics, including Jacob Viner, who in early 1934 would become an adviser to the Treasury, had intermediate or mixed views regarding the gold standard. Viner thought that it had become highly unstable, but he did not think that there was an obvious replacement for it. In his 1932 Harris Lecture, Viner said that "it seems wise policy for countries still on the gold standard to exploit more fully its possibilities of service before abandoning it as utterly incorrigible. But the gold standard has rightly been put on the defensive, and only substantial assurance of better performance in the future than in the past will entitle it a new lease of life." 76 Viner and many of his Chicago colleagues were highly pragmatic and critical of the way in Awalt (1969, fn.4) points out that in June 1932, Adolph C. Miller, a Fed Board member since 1914, discussed the possibility of putting in place a gold embargo. In both of his memoirs Moley says that the idea of using the "Trading with the Enemy Act" as legal authority to declare the March 6 banking holiday originated with Miller. Interestingly, during the first half of 1933 FDR met repeatedly -and often alone -with Miller. There is no evidence, however, that he had any influence on FDR's views on the gold standard or on the devaluation of the dollar. Indeed, and as pointed out above, the general sense at the time was that Miller was a supporter of the standard. It should be added that Tugwell doesn't mention Miller in any of his memoirs or diaries. Berle mentions him only once, in connection with the outbreak of World War II. 76 Viner (1932), p. 39. which the Federal Reserve had acted since the mid-1920s. They argued vehemently that a central bank had to pursue a countercyclical policy in order to smooth economic activity through time, and avoid major cyclical gyrations. Keynes (1933), p. 20 country, the gold "cover ratio." 83 The goal of both the Warburg and Keynes schemes was to "relieve the anxieties of the world's Central Banks, so as to free their hands to promote loanexpenditure and thus raise prices and restore employment." 84 Interestingly, while in Keynes' 1924 Tract there are several laudatory references to Irving Fisher and his "compensated dollar" plan, in the 1933 The Means to Prosperity there is no reference to either of them.
As the debate on gold dragged on in seminar rooms and in the pages of newspapers and magazines, the members of the Brains Trust continued to labor away. Among other things they had to deal with a deluge of letters to the President-elect with all type of proposals on what to do to bring the crisis to an end. A large number of suggestions had to do with the agricultural sector; other focused on the banking system, which looked increasingly weak; and yet other had to do with the currency and with ways to bring deflation to an end. Some of the proposals made sense, and some were based on fantasy. Keynes (1933), p. 30. 85 Indeed, this piece of legislation was invoked on March 6 to declare the banking holiday, and declare a gold embargo. Awalt (1969) and Moley (1939) 
The London Economic and Monetary Conference
On November 13, barely five days after the election, FDR was informed by President Hoover that the U.S. was about to face a major international crisis. The intergovernmental debt moratorium in place since mid-1931 had expired in June. On November 10 the United Kingdom and France informed the U.S. government that they were unable to make the payment scheduled for December 15, and requested an extension of the moratorium. In the weeks that followed the President and the President-elect met two times, and their representatives began around the clock discussions on what to do. Hoover wanted to appoint a committee formed by members of Congress and of the administration to consider further debt relief. FDR, on the other hand, believed that debtors had to make the payments as scheduled. Behind these positions were deep disagreements on what the U.S. foreign policy ought to be. Hoover was an "internationalist," while FDR believed that his government had to give priority to domestic policies and get recovery going before any substantial initiative regarding debt was launched.
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The intergovernmental debts problem was complicated by two additional issues moving in parallel: the U.S. and the European nations were working on disarmament, and an Economic and Monetary Conference had been convened to discuss policy coordination and the recovery. Hoover and the Europeans wanted all three issues -debts, disarmament, and economics -to be discusses jointly, and they argued that the Conference should begin, at the latest, in April 1933. The President-elect and his team (including the members of the Brains Trust), on the other hand, believed that the three problems had to be approached separately and that the Conference should take place much later during the year. 90 They didn't want to be distracted with foreign affairs questions during the first few months of the administration, and they wanted time to understand the issues to be discussed at the conference, including the possible return of the United Kingdom to the gold standard, and how to deal with the fact that France had been accumulating gold reserves at a very rapid clip. 91 After long negotiations and much wrangling, FDR's views prevailed and the London Conference was scheduled for June 1933. It was supposed to be a long meeting with delegations from almost every country in the world and a very broad agenda.
88 Both the Willis letter and Rogers' memorandum were attached by Tugwell to his Revised Diary. Tugwell (1952) , as reproduced in Namorato (1992, p. 368-372) . 89 These two positions reflected different interpretations on the causes of the depression. For Hoover, the main cause was a succession of external shocks; returning to prosperity, thus, required an active stance regarding world economic affairs. FDR, on the contrary, believed that the depression was the domestic policy mistakes. 90 Not everyone in FDR's circle agreed with these views. The seasoned diplomat Norman Davis, for example, pushed for an early Conference that would address the broadest possible set of issues. 91 As noted, the United Kingdom and a number of countries linked to sterling went off gold on September 21, 1931. A number of countries followed during in the months to come: Denmark, Norway and Sweden on September 29; Finland on October 12; Canada on October 19; and Japan on December 13, 1931. Four Latin American countries went abandoned the gold standard even before the U.K.: Argentina (12/1929), Brazil (10/1030), Mexico (7/1931) and El Salvador (10/1931).
Stabilizing the exchanges
As soon as a date for the London Conference was set, FDR asked the members of the Brains Trust to work on it. Moley was in charge of coordinating a team that included Treasury experts, banking advisers, some members of Congress, as well as officials from the Federal Reserve.
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The request to work on the Conference, which among other things meant meeting with foreign delegations, came on top of other assignments, such as thinking about policies to provide immediate relief to debtors, especially in the agricultural sector, and helping the President-elect assemble the Cabinet.
On January 13 1933, Tugwell wrote in his diary that he had met Herbert Feis, a senior adviser to the Secretary of State, about the preparatory negotiations for the London Conference: 93 "He [Feis] said that things are going well… This is contrary to press reports… The press has it that the British reluctance about currency stabilization is hampering everything. It may be; but we, also, might meet them by going off gold, I suppose. It's worth considering at any rate." 94 The key words in this entry -"might," "I suppose," "worth considering" -capture, once again, the doubts that Tugwell and his colleagues continued to have with respect the whole gold question.
Feis was not particularly impressed by FDR's advisers: "My first talks with the assorted members of the Brain Trust (sic)… left me puzzled. Their knowledge of foreign affairs seemed to be slighter than their assurance." 95 This view was quite generalized among those that worked on the preparations for the London Conference. Frederick Leith-Ross, a senior economic adviser to the British government, and an expert on the gold standard and global finances who in early 1933 participated in the first phase of the negotiations, had this to say about the Brains Trust:
he President seemed to rely more on a coterie of personal advisers… than on his ministers… These personal advisers were mostly professors and were locally known as the 'Brains Trust'… The principal of the Brains Trust with whom I had to deal was Professor Moley, who had been a professor of Criminology at a girls' college… [Moley] was free of prejudices and ready to appreciate arguments put to him but almost completely lacking in detailed knowledge of many of the questions that we discussed… With him were Dr. Feis (who had attended the Preparatory Committee at Geneva), Mr. Tugwell and Mr. Taussig, all competent economists but with little experience in finance." 92 Moley was the only person to accompany FDR to his first meeting with Hoover, where they discussed the end of the moratorium and the upcoming London Conference. In that first meeting, held on November 22, Hoover was with his Secretary of The Treasury, Ogden Mills, who had been a classmate of FDR's at Harvard and was his neighbor in Hyde Park. Roosevelt and Mills disliked each other intensely. 93 Feis went on to write a valuable memoir of his experiences during this period, when he was involved as an adviser to both Secretaries Henry Stimson and Cordell Hull. Feis (1966) . 94 Tugwell 1935) as reproduced in Namorato (1992, p. 59). 95 Feis (1966) , p. 1. 96 The "girl's college" quip refers to the fact that Moley's official university appointment was at Barnard College. Leith-Ross (1969) , p. 165.
Leith-Ross went on to consign that more often than not his American counterparts didn't quite know what to think or what position to take regarding the gold standard: "I remarked at the time [April-May 1933] that they sometimes gave me a restful interlude by embarking on an economic controversy between themselves which made me wonder whether we were engaged on intergovernmental negotiations or attending a debating society."
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One of the key issues to be addressed at the London Conference was the "stabilization of the exchanges." The idea was to stabilize currency values for at least the duration of the Conference, as a prelude for a possible return to the international gold standard. Because of the importance of Great Britain in the world economy, this discussion implied mostly -but not exclusively -at what rate to stabilize the pound sterling. Keynes proposal for the Conference -contained in Chapters IV and V of The Means to Prosperity -, was based on the idea that every country would adopt his "qualified gold standard" with fixed exchange rates, greater monetary flexibility, and the ability by central banks to facilitate massive "loan-expenditures."
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Almost everyone thought that stabilizing the pound was a step in the right direction, but the question was at what rate? Between May 1925, when Britain returned to the gold standard, and September 1931, when it went off gold, sterling had been fixed at its historical level of 4.86 dollars per pound. 99 In early February 1933, when negotiations on the London Conference intensified, the market rate was $3.40 per pound, implying a depreciation of sterling of 30% from par. This, according to the American negotiators, gave the sterling area countries an unfair competitive advantage in world markets. Stabilization was to occur, they argued, at a significantly stronger value for the British currency.
Moley believed that the stabilization of exchanges was important, but that negotiations on this issue -and on the tariff, for that matter -should not distract the incoming administration from the need to get domestic recovery going. In his 1966 memoirs he writes: "It seemed to me that… the stabilization of British and French currencies could not have much to do with the primary need for recovery in the United States. Further, coming to terms on these issues would take months, while the restoration of public confidence by vigorous domestic measures would produce results at home almost immediately." (Moley 1966, p.53 ).
FDR's closest advisers believed that different countries deserved different degrees of consideration at the London Conference and during negotiations on intergovernmental debts. On November 15, only two days after FDR found out about the impending debt crisis, Adolf Berle sent a long memorandum to Raymond Moley, where he wrote that the French were not "entitled to much consideration. The drive on the American gold last summer suggests that the Quai 97 Leith-Ross (1968) , pp. 166. 98 Keynes plan for the Conference would evolve into his Bretton Woods plan. See Steil (2013) for a fascinating account of the interaction between Keynes and Harry Dexter White in 1944. 99 Strictly speaking, until September 1931 the pound was tied to gold, and so was the USD. Consequently, both currencies had a fixed exchange rate between themselves (they exhibited minimal fluctuations within the "gold points").
D'Orsay would not have been wholly sorry to see the United States go off the gold standard, permitting payment of the American debt in depreciated dollars instead than in gold."
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The British believed that stabilization was fundamental, but didn't quite know at what rate it was appropriate to do it. This view is aptly summarized by Leith-Ross (1968, p 168) in his memoirs: "While we did not question the desirability of the eventual return to a stabilized exchange rate, we felt that more experience was needed before we could decide what precise rate we would be able to maintain." During the months to come, the question of at what level to stabilize the exchanges continued to be a dominant one. At some point in early April, Professor Oliver Sprague, a Treasury adviser that had been FDR's economics teacher at Harvard and a former consultant at the Bank of England, suggested stabilizing it at $3.65; a few days later Moley talked of $3.85. 101 And in early June, Leith-Ross pointed out that recent fluctuations in the currency market made the decision very difficult. "Sterling which not long ago had been worth less than $3.20 was now fetching over $5.20."
102
The question of at what level to stabilize the exchanges is directly related to whether the currency is "in line with fundamentals," or if, on the contrary, it is misaligned (overvalued or undervalued). Nowadays this type of analysis has become routine, and is periodically performed by the multilateral institutions (IMF, World Bank), central banks, and investment banks. In the late 1920s and early 1930s technical analyses on these issues were mostly confined to purchasing power parity calculations. Indeed, this method had been used by Cassel and Keynes when looking at the interwar situation in Europe. 103 Interestingly, there are no discussions in the Brains Trust diaries, correspondence, or memoires along these lines. Indeed, in the early 1930s the economics profession did not focus on probable exchange rate misalignment when discussing the possibility that the U.S. would go off gold. Most of the discussion emphasized the monetary side, tending to play down the trade implications of the problem. In addition, there were very few (if any) detailed analyses on how devaluation would affect the balance of trade, and through this channel gold flows. This is, to some extent, surprising, given that Alfred Marshall had published in 1923 his Money, Credit and Commerce, with its detailed discussion of the role of elasticities in international trade.
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Analyzing in detail whether the dollar was misaligned in the early 1930s is well beyond the scope of this paper. However, and in order to have some notion about orders of magnitude, in Figure 6 I display the evolution of two monthly trade-weighted real exchange rate indexes for the USD for this period -RER4 and RER5. The RER4 index includes the currencies of the United Kingdom, Canada and France; the RER5 adds Italy and Switzerland. These indexes have a base of 1913=100. The Figure captures , clearly, the effects of a number of shocks and policy decisions on the U.S. real exchange rate. In particular, it is possible to see the consequences of the suspension of the gold standard during the Great War, the return to the gold standard by the sterling area countries (the U.K. and Canada) and Switzerland in 1925, the return to gold by Germany in 1924, and by France and Italy in 1926. The devaluation of sterling in September 1931 is captured by the positive spike in the RER during that month; and the devaluation of the dollar in 1933-34 by a spike in the opposite direction in both indexes. The devaluation of the French and Swiss Francs are also clearly captured by the data.
In Figure 7 I present data on the evolution of the current account balance over GDP for [1919] [1920] [1921] [1922] [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] . As may be seen, in every year between 1919 and 1933 the U.S. ran a current account surplus. These were very large in the years immediately following the Great War, reflecting the very high prices of agricultural commodities. After 1923 the surpluses hover around 0.5% of GDP.
Figures 6 and 7 show two things: (a) In late 1932 the RER indexes for the USD were between 12% and 16% higher than in 1913. That is, the dollar was approximately 14% stronger than it had been just before the war. (b) In 1931 and 1933 the U.S. was still experiencing a current account surplus; this was true in spite of the fact that, as pointed out by Wigmore (1987) and Temin and Wigmore (1990) , foreign central banks and foreign investors withdrew significant amounts of gold during that period. However, it is important to stress that although there were significant week to week fluctuations in gold flows, the overall contribution of the current account to the stock of bullion was positive in 1931 and 1932. Taken together these two facts suggest that the USD may have been slightly overvalued at the time. This would have called for a small correction in the exchanges relative to the pre war levels. However, neither the RER data nor the current account information indicates that a massive correction of the exchanges was needed from a purely "fundamentals" point of view.
No one knew where FDR stood
During the 1932 campaign the general sentiment among the population had been that in spite of its shortcomings the gold standard was the best system America could have. However, as Inauguration Day approached and the Depression deepened, sentiments among some began to change. Moley characterized the situation in the weeks before inauguration as follows: In the middle of this upheaval FDR didn't appear to have a strong view on what to do, or how to handle the situation. If anyone would know this, it was Moley, who saw Roosevelt for several hours every day. According to him, "in the midst of all the talk of "reflation" by dollar manipulation, no one knew where the President-elect stood." (Moley 1966, p. 135) .
In late February, just a few days before inauguration, the Brains Trust's views on the dollar and the gold standard had not changed from what they had been during the primary and presidential campaigns. That is to say, Moley, Tuwell and Berle did not have a strong or definitive position on these matters. They continued to waver and doubt; they still believed in the merits of experimentation and of leaving all options open; at times they looked at the "compensated dollar" scheme with sympathy, and at others they strongly criticized those that believed that most problems stemming from the Depression could be cured by the simple manipulation of the price of gold. To put it simply, on March 4 th , the day Franklin Delano Roosevelt was to take over as President, there was no concrete or definitive plan for taking the U.S. off gold and devaluing the dollar. Worst yet, the incoming administration had no plan of its own for saving the banking system, which was about to collapse. 107 It seemed that in many ways FDR and his team were taking the ideas of experimenting and improvising a bit too far.
A note on what came later
On Inauguration Day the Brains Trust was effectively disbanded. Ray Moley became Assistant Secretary of State, and for a few months he continued to be FDR's confidant. He would meet with the President every morning, while FDR was still in bed. Rex Tugwell became Assistant Secretary in the Department of Agriculture and immediately immersed himself in efforts to pass the AAA with its controversial crops allotment provision. Adolf Berle decided to stay in New York and continued to practice law. He would occasionally write to FDR and they would sometimes meet for a chat, but during the First New Deal Berle had no government obligations.
Formally, this paper should end with the dissolution of the Brains Trust, but doing so would mean leaving too many things dangling, and a good suspenseful story without a proper end. The purpose of this Section, thus, is to briefly go over the gold-related events that occurred between inauguration and the official devaluation of the dollar on January 31 1934. 108 At that time the price of gold was set at $35 per ounce, a price that prevailed until August 1971 when President Richard Nixon closed the Treasury's "gold window" and the dollar was once again devalued.
The gold embargo
On March 4, 1933, the day Franklin D. Roosevelt was inaugurated as president, the nation was facing the third banking crisis of the Great Depression. Trouble had begun two weeks earlier in Detroit, when on February 14 the Guardian National Bank, an institution controlled by Henry Ford and one of the largest banks in the Midwest, had been closed by regulators. The crisis spread rapidly throughout the nation. Fearing for their savings, the public withdrew hordes of currency and gold from banks, both small and big.
In the early hours of March 6, less than 36 hours after moving into the White House, the new President signed Presidential Proclamation No. 2039 declaring a national bank holiday. The reason given for this drastic measure was in line with the Trading with the Enemy Act. The proclamation stated that the government's goal was to "prevent the export, hoarding, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency." 109 During the days that followed officials of the incoming and outgoing administrations drafted legislation aimed at closing insolvent banks and reestablishing confidence in the nation's financial system. On Thursday March 9 the Emergency Banking Act was approved by both houses of Congress, and on Monday March 13, banks deemed to be healthy began to open. Two days later, the president signed Executive Order N. 6073, "Relative to the Reopening of Banks." Among other provisions it stated that "until further order, no individual, partnership, association or corporation, including any banking institution, shall export or otherwise remove… any gold coin, gold bullion or gold certificates."
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Very early in the morning of March 6 (at 1 AM or so), and immediately after the bank holiday was announced, Secretary of the Treasury Will Woodin told The New York Times that it was "ridiculous and misleading to say that we are off the gold standard… We are definitely on the gold standard. Gold merely cannot be obtained for several days."
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On March 6 the front page of The New York Times illustrated the gravity of the situation. An eight columns headline announced the bank holiday. Some of main stories' titles were: "Roosevelt puts embargo on gold," "Prison for gold hoarder," and "City scrip to be ready today or tomorrow to replace currency." Buried among this news, on the leftmost column, there was a story from Germany titled "Hitler bloc wins a Reich majority." See Figure 8 .
On March 13, when many banks reopened, something extraordinary happened: the public redeposited massive amounts of currency in their banks. Many analysts credited FDR's First Fireside Chat, delivered on Sunday March 12, for the return of confidence. Gold, however, was returned to the banking system at a slower pace than currency. On April 5, and as a response to the slower return of bullion, the president signed Executive Order No. 6102 ordering the public to sell all gold holdings to the Federal Reserve; from that point onward the holding of gold in excess of $100 was prohibited. The Order, however, contemplated three exceptions, and stated that some exports of gold would be allowed by the Treasury.
112 Surprisingly, during the days that followed, global currency markets remained calmed and the dollar was stable.
We are off gold
On April 18, immediately after the Easter holiday, the dollar came under significant pressure, and, for the first time since the embargo, broke through the "gold points," making the export of gold profitable. A number of banks applied, immediately, for export licenses. 
Roosevelt's "bombshell," the gold buying program, and the Gold Act
On June 2 the government sold, for the first time in almost fifteen years, debt without a clause explicitly stating that these were gold-denominated obligations. On June 5 Congress issues a Joint Proclamation abrogating the clause that linked debts to the (official) price of gold, for all future and past, public and private, contracts.
On June 3 the London World Economic Conference was officially opened. In the weeks that followed the U.S. delegation, which was headed by the Secretary of State Cordell Hull, slowly made progress on all fronts under discussion. In particular, a preliminary agreement was reached with the British and the French for stabilizing currency values during the duration of the conference. This was viewed as a prelude for a more permanent stabilization plan and, even, for an eventual return to the international gold standard (possibly at new parities and possibly, as Keynes had suggested, with hew "rules of the game").
On July 3, however, all hopes for an agreement were shattered when Secretary Hull received a long cable from the President informing him that he would not agree to any attempt to peg the value of the dollar. The cable stunned every delegate, and came to be known as "Roosevelt's 117 Moley (1966) bombshell." Two days later the President held a press conference where he explained his decision as follows: 119 "The whole question comes down to the word 'stabilization.' We have a very different thought about the definition of the word than do some of the Continental countries… We are not ready to export gold… and we are not ready to go along on the creation of some stabilization fund which might obligate us to export gold."
The markets reacted instantaneously. That week the USD lost 8.1% with respect to the pound, and 9.4% relative to the French Franc. The official price of gold, however, remained fixed at its historical level -set in 1834 -of $20.67 per ounce.
In early August, Administration lawyers began to explore the possibility of the government buying -on consignment -newly minted gold at a price that exceeded the official parity. Original discussions revolved around a price of $28 per ounce. 120 On August 29, 1933, the plan was announced through Executive Order No. 6261. This plan, which was the brainchild of Professor George F. Warren, moved the U.S. closer to an official devaluation of the USD in terms of gold. As explained by FDR himself, the price to be paid for newly minted goal was to be "equal to the best price obtainable in the free gold markets of the world." 121 On October 22, the President announced, during his Fourth Fireside Chat, that he was expanding the gold buying program. He said that the "United States must take firmly in its own hands the control of the gold value of our dollar." 122 He then described the expanded policy as follows:
"I am authorizing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to buy gold newly minted in the United States at prices to be determined from time to time after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the President. Whenever necessary to the end in view we shall also buy or sell gold in the world market." During the months that followed prices paid for gold increased steadily from $29.01 per ounce on October 21, to $31.96 on October 30, $33.32 on November 11, and $34.06 on December 30, 1933.
On January 15, 1934, when the price paid by the RFC for gold was $34.06, the President sent a message to Congress requesting legislation to "organize a sound and adequate currency system." 123 Two weeks later, on Tuesday January 30, Congress passed the Gold Reserve Act of
Concluding remarks
President Roosevelt did not take the US off the gold standard because he was convinced that this was the best course of action, or because he had a comprehensive and detailed plan on what to do in the international arena. FDR took the US off gold because he ran out of options. He had almost no alternative but to do what he did. What is interesting is that he did run out of options so quickly: the final banking crisis had exploded only days before he took over, and the Senate's decision that go for inflation gathered tremendous force in early April. The banking crisis forced him to put in place the gold embargo on March 6, and the Senate actions forced him to go along with the Thomas Amendment on April 18. Given the circumstances, one may argue that he never had a fighting chance for maintaining the country on the gold standard.
What is remarkable from today's perspective is that this whole program was undertaken with, basically, no input from professional economists. Of course, Rex Tugwell was there, but as pointed out repeatedly throughout this paper, his expertise on monetary issues was (very) limited. FDR would occasionally talk to bankers -including his uncle Fred Delano -, and journalists with some knowledge on financial matters, but these were not real experts. As noted, during the campaign he met (once) with Irving Fisher, and after the election he had a conversation with James Harvey Rogers and H. Parker Willis, but none on these meeting was a profound strategy session. Occasionally FDR would talk to the top echelon of the Federal Reserve System -Eugene Meyer, Eugene Black, Adolph Miller, and George Harrison -, but once again there was no detailed plan discussed in these meetings. During the first six months of his presidency he also met twice with George F. Warren, the Cornell professor who, as noted, would become so influential after June 1933. On these two occasions, however, Warren was with a large group of people, and didn't have an opportunity to discuss in detail his plan with the President. This would happen later in the year, when on the suggestion of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Warren would meet often, and many times alone, with the President.
The fact of the matter is that there was no team of economists assigned to analyzing the "gold problem" and coming up with concrete and detailed suggestions. This paucity of professional advice continued during 1933 and all the way to the passing of the Gold Act of January 1934. It is true that, as noted above, starting in mid-July 1933 he met frequently with Professors Warren and Rogers, but these meetings were ad-hoc and unstructured -they often took place early in the morning while the President was still in bed -, and not a single in-depth study on the consequences of the devaluation was presented to the President. After October 22 these early meetings were mostly to determine the RFC price for gold for that particular day. 1921 1923 1925 1927 1929 1931 1933 1935 1937 1939 CA/GNP CA/GNP 
